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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2006). The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn, Judge, Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah submitted an order overruling appellant's 
objection to Commissioner Michael S. Evan's issuance of a protective order on October 
30, 2006. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 etseq. (2006). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the district court properly ruled that the appellant, Rocky 
Corwell ("Corwell"), was a cohabitant under the Cohabitant Abuse Act ("Act") when he 
was a former spouse of the appellee Stacey Hall ("Hall"). 
Issue 2: Whether Corwell waived any right to a hearing under the Cohabitant 
Abuse Act when he filed his Notice to Submit for Decision notifying the district court 
that the case was ready for a final resolution. 
Standard of Review: The district court based its jurisdiction over Corwell on a 
legal finding that Corwell was a "cohabitant" under the Act. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
6-l(2)(a) (2006) and (R. at 148). Corwell's right to a hearing under the Act also involves 
a question of law. This Court reviews the district court's legal conclusions for 
correctness. Keene v. Bonser, 107 P.3d 693, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. 30-6-l(2)-(3) COHABITANT ABUSE ACT - DEFINITIONS: 
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuant to 
Section 15-2-1 or a person who is 16 years of age or older 
who: 
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(a) is or was a spouse of the other party; 
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party; 
(c) is related by blood or marriage to the other party; 
(d) has one or more children in common with the other 
party; 
(e) is the biological parent of the other party's unborn 
child; or 
(f) resides or has resided in the same residence as the 
other party. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does not include: 
(a) the relationship of natural parent, adoptive parent, or 
step-parent to a minor; or 
(b) the relationship between natural, adoptive, step, or 
foster siblings who are under 18 years of age. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 30-6-l(2)-(3) COHABITANT ABUSE ACT - ABUSE OR DANGER OF 
ABUSE—PROTECTIVE ORDERS: 
(1) Any cohabitant who has been subjected to abuse or domestic 
violence, or to whom there is a substantial likelihood of abuse 
or domestic violence, may seek an ex parte protective order or 
a protective order in accordance with this chapter, whether or 
not that person has left the residence or the premises in an 
effort to avoid further abuse. 
(2) A petition for a protective order may be filed under this 
chapter regardless of whether an action for divorce between 
the parties is pending. 
(3) A petition seeking a protective order may not be withdrawn 
without approval of the court. 
UTAH CODE ANN, 30-6-4,3(1)(E) COHABITANT ABUSE ACT - HEARINGS ON EX PARTE 
ORDERS: 
(1) When a court issues an ex parte protective order the court 
shall set a date for a hearing on the petition within 20 days 
after the ex parte order is issued. 
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(e) If the hearing on the petition is heard by a 
commissioner, either the petitioner or respondent may 
file an objection within ten days of the entry of the 
recommended order and the assigned judge shall hold 
a hearing within 20 days of the filing of the objection. 
UTAH R. CIV. PROC. R. 7(D): 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, 
either party may file a "Request to Submit for Decision.'1 The 
request to submit for decision shall state the date on which the 
motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if 
any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was 
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party 
files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(b)(1), for purposes of this 
appeal, Appellee agrees with the statement of the case and facts found on pages 4-6 of the 
Brief of the Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, the district court properly upheld the Commissioner's issuance of the 
protective order against Corwell under the Cohabitant Abuse Act ("Act"). Corwell is a 
cohabitant under the Act because he is Hall's former spouse. The annulment of the 
parties' marriage does not preclude Corwell from being classified as a cohabitant. In 
addition, the fact that the parties never resided together does not have any bearing on the 
district court finding jurisdiction over Corwell under the Act. 
Second, Corwell waived his right to a hearing under the Act when he filed his 
Notice to Submit for Decision ("Notice"). The Notice stated that the case was ready for 
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resolution by the court. In the alternative, the district court's failure to hold a hearing is 
not reversible error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING 
THAT CORWELL, AS HALL'S FORMER SPOUSE, WAS A 
COHABITANT UNDER THE COHABITANT ABUSE ACT EVEN 
THOUGH CORWELL NEVER RESIDED WITH HALL. 
Corwell is a cohabitant under the Cohabitant Abuse Act ("Act") and the district 
court properly overruled Corwell's objection to the Commissioner's issuance of the 
protective order against him. The Act provides protection to victims of domestic 
violence. Victims can only obtain a protective order under the Act if their alleged 
aggressor is a "cohabitant" for purposes of the Act. 
Corwell contends that he is not a cohabitant because, by virtue of the annulment, 
he was never Hall's spouse and because he never resided with Hall. The following 
sections will show that 1) Corwell is a cohabitant under the Cohabitant Abuse Act 
because he was Hall's spouse; and 2) Corwell is a cohabitant even though he never 
resided with Hall. 
A. Corwell is a cohabitant under the Cohabitant Abuse Act because he 
was Hall's spouse. 
The district court properly upheld the issuance of a protective order against 
Corwell under the Act because he was Hall's spouse. The Act does not leave the 
meaning of "cohabitant" open for interpretation. Rather, it clearly outlines several ways 
in which an individual might attain "cohabitant" status. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1(2) 
(2006). The most relevant section for purposes of this appeal is section (2)(a), which 
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states that a "'cohabitant' means ... a person who... is or was a spouse of the party." 
(emphasis added). The Act is broad in its cohabitant definition to provide remedies for 
previously unprotected victims. Bailey v. Bayles, 18 P.3d 1129, 1132 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 
2001) ("The purpose of the Cohabitant Abuse Act was to create a timely and simplified 
process whereby some level of protection and safety could be afforded to victims who 
had previously been outside the umbrella of orders available to persons involved in 
criminal prosecutions."). 
In interpreting the Act and its definition of "cohabitant," this Court "look[s] first to 
the plain language of the statute to discern legislative intent." Keene v. Bonser, 107 P.3d 
693, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted). "In construing the plain language of a 
statute, words 'which are used in used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in 
the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for 
laymen in such daily usage.'" Id. 
The plain language of section (2)(a) defining cohabitation clearly applies to 
spouses or former spouses. There is no ambiguity in this definition and no need to look 
beyond the plain language of the statute. Therefore, applying the statute, Corwell is a 
cohabitant because he is Hall's former spouse. It is undisputed that Corwell and Hall 
were married on March 19, 2005 in Clark County, Nevada. (R. at 29). 
Corwell contends that section (2)(a) should not apply to him because his marriage 
to Hall was annulled and declared void ab initio on March 29, 2006. Brief of Appellant, 
p. 6. However, the Act does not include such an exception in the case of annulment. In 
fact, while the Utah legislature contemplated and created specific exceptions to the 
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cohabitant definition for parent-child relationships and siblings under the age of eighteen, 
it notably did not create an exception for annulled parties. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-
(3) (2006). 
Corwell argues that if this Court applies the Act to annulled parties then it is 
abrogating the common law of annulment. He argues that the common law of annulment 
can only be abrogated through a specific directive from the legislature. However, 
treating annulled parties as former spouses and cohabitants under the Act does not undo 
the common law benefits of annulment for the involved parties. For example, the 
annulment still relieves parties from financial obligations such as alimony or other forms 
of marital support. 
Corwell also argued below at the district court level that the annulment precluded 
him from being classified as a cohabitant under the Act. The district court correctly 
rejected this proposition and stated in its order: 
The clear purpose of the Protective Order statute is to provide 
relief for persons who are the victims of violence in intimate 
relationships. The clear intention of the legislature is that 
those purposes be applied broadly. Those purposes are not 
served by reliance on the legal fiction that the parties were 
never married due to the annulment. The fact that they once 
had the status of a married couple is sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction under this act. 
(R. at 148-9). 
Like the district court, this Court also rejected a narrow interpretation of the Act's 
cohabitant definition in Keene v. Bonser. There, Bonser contested the district court's 
finding "that he "resided in the same residence" as Keene and was thus a "cohabitant" 
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under the Act." Keene, 107 P.3d at 695. Despite living in Wyoming, Bonser frequently 
stayed at Keene's Utah residence. Id. Bonser argued, inter alia, that he could not be a 
cohabitant under the Act's residency prong, UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-l(2)(f) (2006), 
because he could not get a Utah's driver's license and because he could not register to 
vote in Utah. Id. at 696. In other words, Bonser argued that the Court should narrow the 
Act's cohabitant definition. The Court in Keene, however, rejected Bonser's proposal for 
a "narrow, legalistic interpretation" of the Act's cohabitant definition. Id. In doing so, it 
noted that the "Utah legislature has adopted a broader view of cohabitation in the 
cohabitant abuse context than Utah case law has in other contexts." Id. (e mphasis 
added). 
Akin to Bonser's argument in Keene, Corwell is relying on the legal fiction of 
annulment to argue that he should not be considered a cohabitant. Like in Keene, this 
Court should reject Corwell's proposal for a narrow and legalistic interpretation of the 
Act's cohabitant definition. 
In addition to the plain language of the statute, public policy dictates that the Act 
should extend protection to spouses who are victims of domestic violence even where 
there has been an annulment. The Keene Court looked beyond the statutory definitions 
and considered "the purpose behind the Act." Id. at 698. It noted the "expansive reach 
intended by legislatures in enacting domestic violence and abuse statutes." Id. Likewise, 
the district court recognized the purpose of the Act to protect "victims of violence in 
intimate relationships." (R. at 148). Additionally, these purposes are evident in the Act 
itself if one looks to the types of relationships the Act targets for protection from 
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domestic abuse. For example, other than spouses or former spouses, the Act protects 
those who reside together, have children together, or are related by blood or marriage. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-l(2)(c), (d) & (f) (2006). 
Corwell and Hall were involved in an intimate relationship as evidenced by their 
March 2005 marriage. This is precisely the type of involved emotional relationship the 
Act is intended to encompass. The annulment did not reduce the emotional entanglement 
of the parties. In fact, in many cases, annulment can, like divorce, escalate the parties' 
emotions of hatred and animosity towards one another. As evidenced in this very case, 
the parties continued to have problems even after the annulment. For instance, it is 
undisputed that on one occasion Corwell called Hall and threatened to "punch her in the 
face." Brief of Appellant p. 5. In sum, the Act is meant to protect victims who are 
involved in complex emotional relationships from future violence. The parties' 
annulment did not diminish the complexity of their relationship. Thus, the Act should 
continue to provide protection to victims, like Hall, even after a marriage is annulled. 
To conclude, the district court properly found jurisdiction over Corwell under the 
Act because he is Hall's former spouse. This Court should reject Corwell's argument 
that the annulment precludes him from being a cohabitant. The Act is not meant to be 
applied in such a narrow and legalistic manner. Finally, public policy dictates extending 
the Act to former spouses even where the spouses have annulled the marriage. 
B. Corwell is a cohabitant even though he never resided with Hall. 
The district court properly found jurisdiction over Corwell as a cohabitant under 
the Act even though he never resided with Hall. A person who "resides or has resided in 
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the same residence as the other party" is a cohabitant for purposes of the Act. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 30-6-l(2)(f) (2006). However, presenting evidence of joint residency is not 
the only way to establish cohabitant status under the Act. For instance, a person is a 
cohabitant if they are or were a spouse of the other party, if they are related by blood or 
marriage to the other party, if they have common children with the other party, or if they 
are the biological parent of the other party's unborn child. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-
l(2)(a), (c)-(e) (2006). None of these relationships require the parties to have resided 
together at any time. For example, it is quite common for those who are related by blood 
not to reside together. Also, many people who share common children have never 
resided together. Thus, it is clear from the Act's cohabitant definition that there is no 
separate requirement for residency. 
Despite the unambiguous language of the statute, Corwell repeatedly argues that 
the Act's cohabitant definition requires some form of residency. For example, he argues 
that "[t]he primary characteristic of all the relationships encompassed by the Act is that 
they require the parties to have resided together at some point." Brief of Appellant, p. 7. 
He also argues that "[s]ince the parties ... never resided together as required by the Act, 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue an ex parte protective order against appellant." 
Id. at p. 10 (emphasis added). These arguments ignore the plain language of the statute. 
Nowhere does the Act require residency. As mentioned, there are several ways to 
establish cohabitant status without having to show residency. 
While some states require proof of residency to obtain jurisdiction over an alleged 
aggressor, Utah's Act encompasses a larger range of relationships and thus does not 
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require a showing of residency. For example, in Vermont's domestic abuse statute, 
courts can only obtain jurisdiction over "persons living together or sharing occupancy 
and persons who have lived together in a sexual relationship." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 1101(2) (2006). Similarly, Ohio's domestic abuse statute limits its jurisdictional reach 
to a "person who is residing or has resided with the offender . . . ." OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2919.25(F)(1)(a) (2007). Vermont and Ohio are among several states that require 
some form of residency to obtain jurisdiction in domestic abuse cases. Had the Utah 
legislature intended to require residency as Corwell contends, it would have stated so 
explicitly as other states have done. 
To conclude, contrary to Corwell's arguments, the Act does not include a 
residency requirement in its cohabitant definition. There are several other ways for a 
party to meet the Act's jurisdictional requirement without ever showing residency. Here, 
the district court properly found jurisdiction over Corwell because the parties were 
spouses. The fact that the parties never resided together does not bear any weight on this 
Court's review of the district court's jurisdictional finding. 
II. CORWELL WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO A HEARING WHEN HE FILED 
HIS NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION. 
Corwell effectively waived any right to a hearing when he filed his Notice to 
Submit for Decision with the district court on October 24, 2006. Corwell filed an 
objection (R. at 89) to the issuance of the protective order against him on June 2, 2006, 
along with a supporting memorandum (R. at 91-96). Once the objection has been filed, 
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the district court is to hold a hearing within twenty days of the filing of the objection. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4.3(l)(e) (2006). 
Approximately five months later, on October 24, 2006, Corwell filed the pleading 
titled 'Notice to Submit for Decision' ("Notice"). (R. at 146). In the Notice, Corwell 
stated that his motion objecting to the issuance of the protective order was "at issue and 
ready for decision of the Court." Under the circumstances, Corwell should not be 
allowed to raise the objection of a lack of hearing now on appeal. The district court 
should have been "given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, 
correct it." See State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). By submitting 
the Notice and representing that the case was ready for decision, Corwell waived the right 
to a hearing. 
Moreover, the district court's failure to hold a hearing is not reversible error. 
Corwell raised two arguments in his objection memorandum: 1) the district court lacked 
jurisdiction because Corwell was not a cohabitant; and 2) the finding that Corwell 
presented a credible threat should be overturned because misrepresentations made by 
Hall in the Petition required a finding that Hall was not credible and should not be 
awarded a protective order. (R. at 91-96). As to this second argument, Corwell did not 
request an opportunity to present new evidence, but rather challenged the finding of a 
threat based on the record evidence received by the Commissioner during the protective 
order hearing (which was not an ex parte hearing). (R. 91-96). 
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The first argument is purely a legal argument which the district court could resolve 
without an evidentiary hearing. It required the district court only to look at the Act's 
definition of cohabitant and determine whether Corwell qualified as a cohabitant. 
With respect to Corwell's second argument, Corwell has not challenged on appeal 
the factual finding that he presented a threat to Hall, and characterizes his argument as a 
purely legal argument. Appellant's Brief, p. 1. By failing to challenge specific factual 
findings, Corwell has waived this issue. Moreover, Corwell's attack on the threat finding 
was based on the record submitted to the Commissioner. As noted above, Corwell did 
not ask for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. In addition, there are undisputed facts 
which support the finding that Corwell presented a threat to Hall's safety. Namely, 
Corwell called and threatened Hall that he would "punch her in the face." Brief of 
Appellant, p. 5. Under the circumstances, remand for a hearing is not warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly found jurisdiction over Corwell under the Cohabitant 
Abuse Act. Also, Corwell waived his right to a hearing under the Act by filing a Notice 
to Submit for Decision indicating to the district court that the case was ready for a final 
resolution. This Court should affirm the judgment of the district court and uphold the 
protective order issued against Corwell. 
MICHAEL ZOM / F 
PARSONS BEHL£ & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Stacey Hall 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of May, 2007, I caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, to: 
JOANNA B.SAGERS 
KERI GARDNER 
Attorneys for Appellee/Petitioner 
Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake 
205 North 400 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
RANDY S. LUDLOW 
Attorney for Appellant/Respondent 
185 South State Street, Suite 208 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM A 
See attached Appellant's Notice to Submit for Decision and Memorandum in Support of 
Respondent's Objection to Commissioner's Issuance of Ex Parte Protective Order. 
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Randy S.Ludlow #2011 
Attorney for Petitioner 
185 South State Street, Suite 208 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 K ^ 
Telephone: (801)531-1300 Us 
Fax: (801)328-0173 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF RESPONDENT'S 
STACY C. HALL ) OBJECTION TO 
COMMISSIONER'S ISSUANCE 
Petitioner, ) OF EX PARTE 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
vs. 
ROCKY CORWELL, 
Respondent. 
Civil No. 064902056 CA 
Judge Quinn 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
COMES NOW the respondent, Rocky Corwell, by and through his attorney of 
record, Randy S. Ludlow, who hereby files his objection, as provided in § 30-6-4.3(l)(e), 
Utah Code Ann., (2006), to the issuance of an ex parte protective order against him by 
Commissioner Evans, on the following grounds: 
I. THE RESPONDENT AND PETITIONER WERE NEVER COHABITANTS AS 
DEFINED IN § 30-6-1, UTAH CODE ANN. (2006), THEREFORE THIS COURT 
LACKS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN EX PARTE PROTECTIVE ORDER 
AGAINST RESPONDENT PURSUANT TO THE COHABITANT ABUSE ACT. 
Petitioner and respondent are not cohabitants as defined in § 30-6-1 of the 
Cohabitant Abuse Act (the "Act"), therefore this court lacks jurisdiction under to the Act 
to issue an ex parte protective order against respondent. The Act defines several classes 
of persons as "cohabitants." The two relevant classes in this matter are found at § 30-6-
l(2)(a), which requires that the parties are or were spouses/and^J 30-6-l(2)(f), which 
requires that the parties reside or resided in the same residence. In this case, the parties 
never resided in the same residence, and the parties' brief marriage was annulled and 
declared void ab initio in March, 2006, prior to the events alleged in petitioner's Verified 
Petition for Protective Order. 
Petitioner indicates in her Verified Petition that the parties did not reside together 
at any time. This is consistent with the sworn stipulation entered into by the parties in the 
annulment action, which is attached as Exhibit A to this Memorandum, wherein the 
petitioner agreed that she and the respondent never resided together at any time. Exhibit 
A, Stipulation, dated March 3, 2006, \ 4. 
Commissioner Evans relied on § 30-6-l(2)(a), which requires that the parties are 
or were spouses. However, the annulment void ab initio had the effect of legally 
rendering the marriage null and void. Utah has generally adopted the common law 
regarding annulments, as evidenced in § 30-1-17.1(2), Utah Code Ann. (2006). Under 
the common law and as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, an annulment "differs 
conceptually from a divorce in that a divorce terminates a legal status, whereas an 
annulment establishes that a marital status never existed." Abridged Fifth Edition (1983). 
Under Utah case law, the only area where annulment is treated differently than at 
common law involves the reinstatement of alimony from a prior marriage following 
annulment of the subsequent marriage. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 564 P.2d 1380 (Utah 
1977). In Ferguson, the Utah Supreme Court relied on principles of equity and public 
policy to find an exception to the common law regarding annulment. The Court looked 
to language in Title 30 of the Utah Code that authorized the district court to award 
alimony and support in annulment actions as equity required. To the Court, this 
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evidenced the Legislature's intent to ensure that woman and children were not left 
without any support following an annulment. Id. at 1382. The Court observed that the 
principal argument for restoring alimony from the prior marriage was that alimony was 
not allowed in annulments and if the woman's prior status was not restored, she would be 
left without support. Id. at 1381. Since the Legislature had provided for alimony in 
annulments, the Court reasoned that it could not mechanically reinstate alimony but had 
to make a determination whether such reinstatement was equitable. The Legislature has 
since clarified the statute to make clear that alimony will be reinstated following an 
annulment void ab initio so long as the prior spouse is made a party to the annulment 
action and his rights are determined therein. § 30-3-5(9), Utah Code Ann. (2006). 
Under the rules of statutory construction, the court must "construe each act of the 
legislature so as to give it full force and effect. When a construction of an act will bring it 
into serious conflict with another act, our duty is to construe the acts to be in harmony 
and avoid conflicts." Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991). Under § 
30-1-17.1, the Legislature makes clear its intent not to abrogate the common law 
regarding annulment. When the Legislature has intended to alter the common law, it has 
done so specifically, as in § 30-3-5(9). 
The Cohabitant Abuse Act does not specify any exceptions to the common law of 
annulment. It states that cohabitants includes parties who were spouses,, Under the 
common law of annulment, the parties to the marriage were never spouses because the 
marriage is considered null at its inception. If the Act is read to incorporate an unstated 
abrogation of the common law, it directly contradicts the Legislature's intent to rely on 
the common law except for certain limited exceptions. 
In order to harmonize the various provisions referred to above, it is necessary to 
follow the previous example set by the Legislature and assume that if the Legislature had 
intended to abrogate the common law and treat annulments in the same manner as 
divorces, it would have stated so within the Act. 
It is likely that the Legislature did not do so, because it was assumed that if the, 
marriage was annulled the parties would still be encompassed within the Act because 
they had resided together. The overall intent of the Act is to provide persons with a legal 
means to protect themselves from violence perpetrated bv the persons with whom they 
reside. The case at hand is unique, however, in that the parties never in fact resided 
together, despite attempting to enter into a marriage. The parties had a wedding but 
because of the petitioner's admitted misrepresentations to induce the respondent to marry 
her, they never in fact had a marriage, which the court recognized in granting the 
annulment void ab initio. Since the parties were never legally spouses and because they 
never resided together as required by the Act, this court lacks jurisdiction to issue an ex 
parte protective order against respondent. Therefore, the ex parte protective order issued 
by Commissioner Evans must be dismissed. 
II. RESPONDENT DOES PRESENT A CREDIBLE THREAT TO PETITIONER'S 
SAFETY THEREFORE THE PROTECTIVE ORDER SHOULD BE DENIED 
Under § 30-6-2, Utah Code Ann. (2006), the petitioner must show previous 
domestic abuse or the substantial likelihood of imminent abuse in order for the court to 
issue a protective order. In the ex parte protective order, Commissioner Evans found that 
the respondent "presents a credible threat to the physical safety" of petitioner. However, 
petitioner makes several material misrepresentations within her verified petition, which 
seriously impact her credibility. 
In her sworn Verified Petition, petitioner states in Paragraph 3 that she and 
respondent are currently married, when in fact the marriage was annulled one month 
earlier. In Paragraph 5, petitioner states that she initiated the annulment action (Third 
District Court case number 054902113) and that respondent was "violently opposed" to 
this action. However, the respondent was in fact the petitioner in that action. A copy of 
the Decree of Annulment is attached as Exhibit B to this Memorandum. Finally, 
petitioner states her name within the Verified Petition as "Stacey Corwell." Pursuant to 
the Decree of Annulment, however, petitioner was awarded her maiden name "Stacy 
Hall." 
Whether petitioner deliberately misled the court or whether she is merely 
confused or in denial regarding her marital status and the procedural history of the 
annulment, these misrepresentations cast serious doubt upon the entire verified petition 
and upon petitioner's version of what occurred in April 2006 and her allegations 
regarding earlier abuse. 
In addition to petitioner's misrepresentations, respondent presented evidence to 
Commissioner Evans indicating that petitioner had been subjecting respondent and his 
girlfriend to ongoing threats and harassment, that respondent requested assistance from 
the Salt Lake City police department to stop petitioner's ongoing harassment prior to his 
alleged threat against petitioner, and that respondent was recovering from the effects of 
anesthesia and recuperating from eye surgery at the time the alleged threat was made. 
Exhibit C, Response in re Protective Order. 
When these circumstances are viewed in their entirety, in light of petitioner's 
false statements in the Verified Petition, it is not substantially likely that respondent 
ronstitutes a credible imminent threat to petitioner. Petitioner has abused this process in 
5 
her ongoing efforts to harass the respondent. Prior abuse or a substantial likelihood of 
imminent abuse by respondent does not exist in this case and the court should deny 
petitioner's request for a protective order. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner and respondent are not cohabitants as defined by the Cohabitant Abuse 
Act, therefore this court lacks jurisdiction to issue a protective order against respondent 
and the petitioner's request must be denied. In the alternative, based on the overall 
circumstances and material falsehoods made by petitioner in her Verified Petition for 
Protective Order, a substantial likelihood does not exist that respondent presents an 
imminent credible threat to petitioner's safety, and respondent asks the court to deny 
petitioner's request for a protective order. 
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